

Pertinence Construed Modally

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A Simple Example (apology to Russell)

Let

- p : “Mars orbits the Sun”
- q : “a red teapot is orbiting Mars”

In Classical Logic


- $\neg p \wedge q \models q$ (**disjunctive syllogism**: $\neg p \wedge (p \vee q) \models q$)
- $\neg p \models \neg p \vee q$
- $\neg p \models \top$
- $\perp \models \neg p$ (**ex contradictione quodlibet**)
- $\models p \rightarrow (q \rightarrow p)$ (**positive paradox**)

But

Some notion of *relevance* or *pertinence*, should hold between premiss and consequence

Classical Logic: the Logic of 'Complete Ignorance'

- $\alpha \models \beta$



Usually

Extra information expressed either as

- *Syntactic rules*, or as
- *Semantic constraints* on sets of sentences

Less Attractive Features of Traditional Relevance Logics [Avron, 1992]

- Conflation of \models with \rightarrow [Anderson and Belnap, 1975, 1992]
- Start with *proof theory*, then find a proper semantics
- Sometimes *metaphysical* ideas get admixed into the relevance endeavour
- **Relevance logics traditionally pay scant attention to *contexts***

Outline

1 Preliminaries

2 Pertinent Entailment

3 Conclusion

Modal Logic

Here: **standard** modal logics

- Propositional language
- Possible worlds semantics

Classes of models

- Sets of models we work with
- Determined by **additional constraints**
 - ▶ Axiom schemas (reflexivity, transitivity, etc.)
 - ▶ Global axioms (see later)

Here we are interested in the class of **reflexive** models

- Axiom schema $\Box\alpha \rightarrow \alpha$: Modal logic KT

Modal Logic

Local consequence

Definition

α entails β in $\mathcal{M} = \langle W, R, V \rangle$ (denoted $\alpha \models^{\mathcal{M}} \beta$) iff for every $w \in W$, if $w \Vdash^{\mathcal{M}} \alpha$, then $w \Vdash^{\mathcal{M}} \beta$.

Definition


Let \mathcal{C} be a class of models

- α entails β in \mathcal{C} (denoted $\alpha \models^{\mathcal{C}} \beta$) iff $\alpha \models^{\mathcal{M}} \beta$ for every $\mathcal{M} \in \mathcal{C}$
- Validity and satisfiability in \mathcal{C} defined as usual

When \mathcal{C} is clear from the context, we write $\alpha \models \beta$ instead of $\alpha \models^{\mathcal{C}} \beta$

Pertinence in the Meta-Level

- The consequent β should **not run wild**



Definition


α *pertinently entails* β in \mathcal{M} (denoted $\alpha \ll^{\mathcal{M}} \beta$) iff $\alpha \models^{\mathcal{M}} \beta$ and $\beta \models^{\mathcal{M}} \diamond \neg \alpha$

Definition

α *pertinently entails* β in the class \mathcal{C} of models (denoted $\alpha \ll^{\mathcal{C}} \beta$) iff for every $\mathcal{M} \in \mathcal{C}$, $\alpha \ll^{\mathcal{M}} \beta$

When \mathcal{C} is clear from the context, we write $\alpha \ll \beta$ instead of $\alpha \ll^{\mathcal{C}} \beta$

Pertinence in the Meta-Level



- Clearly, \llcorner is *infra-modal*: if $\alpha \llcorner \beta$, then $\alpha \models \beta$
- ' \llcorner ' vs. ' \models ' like '<' vs. '='

A Spectrum of Entailment Relations

- Only restriction on R : $id_W \subseteq R \subseteq W \times W$ (modal logic KT)
- The *minimum* (w.r.t. \subseteq) case: $R = id_W$
 - ▶ *maximum pertinence*: $\llcorner = \equiv$
- The *maximum* case: $R = W \times W$ (assume $\alpha \neq \perp$, cf. later)
 - ▶ *minimum pertinence*: $\llcorner = \Vdash$

Theorem

If the underlying modal logic is at least KT, then $\equiv \subseteq \llcorner \subseteq \Vdash$

- Note how, psychologically speaking, with increased pertinence between premiss and consequence ‘if’ tends to drift in the direction of ‘if and only if’ [Johnson-Laird & Savary, 1999]

Properties of \llcorner

- Decidability
 - ▶ Straightforward from definition
- Non-explosiveness
 - ▶ if $\perp \llcorner \alpha$, then $\alpha \equiv \perp$

Theorem

Let $\alpha \llcorner^{\mathcal{L}} \beta$. Then if $\models^{\mathcal{L}} \alpha \rightarrow \perp$, then $\models^{\mathcal{L}} \beta \rightarrow \perp$

- \llcorner is *paratrivial*
 - ▶ $\alpha \not\llcorner \top$ in general
- \llcorner preserves *validities*

Theorem

$\top \llcorner \alpha$ iff $\top \models \alpha$

Properties of \llcorner

- **Disjunctive Syllogism:** $(\neg\alpha \vee \beta) \wedge \alpha \not\llcorner \beta$ ($\beta \wedge \alpha \not\llcorner \beta$)
- \llcorner does **not** satisfy **contraposition**
- \llcorner does **not** satisfy the **deduction theorem** $\alpha \llcorner \beta$ iff $\top \llcorner \alpha \rightarrow \beta$
- **Modus Ponens**

$$\frac{\llcorner \alpha, \llcorner \alpha \rightarrow \beta}{\llcorner \beta}$$

- **Non-Monotonicity:** For \llcorner , the monotonicity rule **fails**:

$$\frac{\alpha \llcorner \beta, \gamma \models \alpha}{\gamma \llcorner \beta}$$

- **Substitution of Equivalentents**
- **Transitivity:** If the underlying logic is at least **S4**

$$\frac{\alpha \llcorner \beta, \beta \llcorner \gamma}{\alpha \llcorner \gamma}$$

Pertinent Conditional

Definition

$$\alpha \diamond \rightarrow \beta \equiv_{\text{def}} (\alpha \rightarrow \beta) \wedge (\beta \rightarrow \check{\diamond} \alpha)$$

Theorem

$$\alpha \prec \beta \text{ iff } \prec \alpha \diamond \rightarrow \beta$$

Proposition

- $\prec \alpha \rightarrow (\beta \rightarrow \alpha)$ (*positive paradox*)
- $\not\prec \alpha \diamond \rightarrow (\beta \diamond \rightarrow \alpha)$
- $\alpha \not\prec \beta \diamond \rightarrow \alpha$

Pertinence and Causation


Example

- s : “the turkey is shot”; a : “it is alive”; w : “the turkey is walking”

Background assumption:

$$\mathcal{B} = \{w \rightarrow a, s \rightarrow \neg a, \diamond s\}$$

\mathcal{M} :



Question: Is α the pertinent *cause* of β ?

- $\neg a \wedge \neg w \not\ll \neg a$; $\neg a \wedge \neg w \not\ll \neg w$
- $a \wedge \square \neg s \not\ll a$; $a \wedge \square \diamond s \ll a$
- $s \not\ll \neg a$; $s \vee \neg a \ll \neg a$

General Setting

- Definition of a *weakening operator* ●
 - ▶ **Weakening** $\alpha \models \bullet\alpha$
 - ▶ **Uniformity** If $\alpha \models \beta$, then $\bullet\alpha \models \bullet\beta$
- Pertinence as *additional constraint* given by ●
 - ▶ $\alpha \triangleleft \beta$ iff $\alpha \models \beta$ and $\beta \models \bullet\alpha$
- **General** pertinent entailment relation
 - ▶ **Reflexivity** $\alpha \triangleleft \alpha$
 - ▶ **Infraclassicality** If $\alpha \triangleleft \beta$, then $\alpha \models \beta$
 - ▶ **Generalized Disjunction** If $\alpha \triangleleft \beta$ and $\gamma \triangleleft \delta$, then $\alpha \vee \gamma \triangleleft \beta \vee \delta$
 - ▶ **Interpolation** If $\alpha \models \beta$, $\beta \models \gamma$, and $\alpha \triangleleft \gamma$, then $\alpha \triangleleft \beta$ and $\beta \triangleleft \gamma$
- Here we have seen **one case**: $\bullet = \diamond^{\smile}$

Conclusion

Contributions

- **Semantic** approach to the notion of pertinence
- Pertinence captured in a **simple modal logic**
- Whole **spectrum** of pertinent entailments, ranging between \equiv and \models
- We restrict some **paradoxes** avoided by relevance logics
- \vdash possesses other **non-classical** properties

Ongoing and Future Work

- Other **infra-modal** entailment relations
- Supra-modal entailment: *prototypical* and *venturous reasoning*
- Relationship with contexts such as *obligations*, *beliefs*, etc
- Pertinent subsumptions in **Description Logics**

More: <http://krr.meraka.org.za>

Thank you!